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MUCH ADO ABOUT MOSAICS:
How ORIGINAL PRINCIPLES APPLY TO EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY
IN UNITEDSTATES V. JONES
Priscilla J. Smith*
This Article argues that supporters and detractors of the
concurring opinions in United States v. Jones have
overemphasized the role of the "mosaic or "aggregation" theory
in the concurrences. This has led to a misreading of those
opinions, an overly narrow view of the Justices 'privacy concerns,
and an obscuring of two limiting principles that are vital to an
analysis of the concurrences. This Article provides a path forward
by revealing the analysis of reasonable expectation of privacy
concerns that is common to both concurrences. The endpoint is a
rule both more limited and broader than a simple application of a
"mosaic theory." It is more limited in the sense that the rule
applies only to surveillance using technology that operates outside
of individual human control and is thus susceptible to overuse and
abuse. It is broader in the sense that it finds surveillance intrusive,
not just where the technology will collect a mosaic of information
that reveals more than each single tile of information itself but
where the technology will chill expression of constitutionally
protected behavior-behavior that can take place "in public" with
other people, but is shared with a limited group.
* Senior Fellow with the Information Society Project at Yale Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy scholars breathed a sigh of relief when the Court held
9-0 in United States v. Jones' that the use of Global Positioning
System ("GPS") surveillance to track the movements of a suspect's
car for a month was a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.' However, the initial high that greeted the Court's
unanimous ruling has been tempered a bit by the requisite
scholarly squabbling.' Scholars and advocates disagree most about
the meaning and long-term viability of the reasoning of Jones's
two concurring opinions, one written by Justice Alito, joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan (the "Alito four"),4 and the
other by Justice Sotomayor,5 and their implications for the use of
other forms of surveillance. Across the two concurrences, five
Justices agreed that "long[] term GPS monitoring in investigations
of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy."6
The most remarkable thing about Jones to those interested in
the evolution of privacy protections in the substantive due process
cases is the difficulty the Justices had articulating exactly what is
wrong with law enforcement use-without a warrant-of
' 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2 Id. at 949; id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring). As the Supreme Court has made clear "over and again," "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct.
1849, 1856 (2011); City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010)
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 93 S. Ct. 2041,
2043-44 (1973) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REv. 311, 314, 315-20 (2012); David C. Gray and Danielle Keats
Citron, A Technology-Centered Approach to Quantitative Privacy (Aug. 14,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2129439.
4 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
5 Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(joining the majority opinion but also agreeing with Justice Alito's analysis "at
the very least[]").
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technology that allows around-the-clock machine surveillance of
anyone for any reason, and specifically why such surveillance
implicates privacy interests. As Walter Dellinger aptly stated in
his address at this Symposium, the Justices seem to be saying,
"This can't be; doctrine to follow."' In the majority opinion,
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts
(the "Scalia four") entirely avoid the "reasonable expectation of
privacy"' question presented by the case.' Instead, joined by
Justice Sotomayor in her separate concurrence,"0 they breathed life
into the physical trespass test," and held that a search occurred
when agents crawled under the defendant's car and attached the
GPS device, committing trespass to property to collect evidence
for law enforcement purposes. 2
The five concurring Justices, on the other hand, (Justice
Sotomayor and the Alito four), reached the question originally
presented in the case: "Whether the warrantless use of a GPS
tracking device on respondent's vehicle to monitor its movements
on public streets violated the Fourth Amendment."" The Alito
7 Walter Dellinger, Keynote Address at the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology Symposium: U.S. v. Jones: Defining a Search in the 21st Century
(Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://ncjolt.org/multimedia/symposium-videos/
(discussing his experience as co-counsel for Antoine Jones).
8 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (noting that after Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967), to determine whether a "search" had occurred, the Court's
cases "applied the privacy analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in [Katz],
which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person's
'reasonable expectation of privacy' ").
9 See id. at 945.
1o Id at 955. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor joins Justice Scalia's
opinion agreeing both that "[w]hen the Government physically invades personal
property to gather information, a search occurs," and that "[t]he reaffirmation of
that principle suffices to decide this case," giving Justice Scalia (joined by
Kennedy, Thomas and Roberts) his fifth vote and the win. Id.
" For a brief discussion of the physical trespass theory, see discussion infra
Part II.A.
12 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
13 Brief for the United States, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL
3561881, at *1.
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four criticize the majority for dodging the issue in the case,14
failing to set out a rule that would regulate police use of electronic
surveillance," and for adopting a test that leads to results that are
incongruous 6 and would vary from state to state.' 7 They argue that
longer term tracking by GPS intrudes on a reasonable expectation
of privacy, thus rejecting the Government's simplistic view that
anything taking place in "public" is not "private."" Unfortunately,
the concurrences are less than clear in their explanations of why
this is so.
The concurrences, though hardly models of clarity, do reveal
an understanding of what is really at stake when law enforcement
engages in permeating machine surveillance, and endorse a rule to
guide evaluations of surveillance techniques in the future.
Importantly, though, to uncover the rule one must resist an
overemphasis on the so-called "mosaic" or aggregation theory" to
determine when a reasonable expectation of privacy has been
violated.20 Under a ruling that relied solely on the mosaic theory,
14 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court's reasoning
largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of
long-term tracking) . . .
" Id. at 962.
16 Id. ("The Court proceeds on the assumption that respondent 'had at least the
property rights of a bailee,' but a bailee may sue for a trespass to chattel only if
the injury occurs during the term of the bailment." (internal citations omitted)).
" Id. at 961-62 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that results under the trespass
theory would be different depending on whether the events at issue in this case
occurred in a community property state or state that has adopted the Uniform
Marital Property Act, or in a non-community property state because those rules
would impact ownership of the car and thus the ability to sue for trespass).
18 Id. at 964 (arguing that "use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy," thereby
rejecting the view advocated by the Government in its Brief for the United
States, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 3561881, at *12.
19 For important work developing the mosaic or aggregation theory, see Rende
McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 432 (2007); Gray and Citron, supra note 3.
For an example of an overemphasis on the mosaic theory by a Jones critic, see
also the discussion infra Part V.
20 This mosaic view was relied on heavily, though not exclusively, in the
lower court's opinion in this case. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544,
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surveillance would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy
whenever it collected individual pieces of information about a
person's location by following them in public, where the
aggregation of these "tiles" of information could be used to
construct a detailed picture of a person's life. 2' This is not the
view of the concurrences.22 Supporters and detractors of the
mosaic approach have overemphasized the centrality of the theory
to the rationales behind Jones's concurrences with two results.
First, this overemphasis on mosaics results in an overly narrow
view of the Justices' privacy concerns. Second, this misreading
has, in turn, obscured two limiting principles that are vital to the
concurring Justices' analysis.23 Aggregation, on its own, need not
invade one's privacy, while monitoring that results in discovery of
even one discrete act that takes place in "public" could constitute a
significant invasion.
Let's be clear at the outset. This Article is not intended to
denigrate the mosaic theory, but only to argue that it is incomplete.
There are holes in it, if you will. An overreliance on it by the
lower court in the case, or perhaps just the popularization of the
enticing "mosaic" label,24 might even have contributed to the
562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted), affd in part sub nom. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945. In Maynard, the court held that prolonged GPS surveillance by
law enforcement violated a reasonable expectation of privacy:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-
term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not
do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal
more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. . . . A
reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of
every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and
each place he stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of
those movements to remain "disconnected and anonymous."
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562-63 (internal citation omitted).
21 See supra note 19; see also discussion infra Part V.
22 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 923 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 927 (Alito,
J., concurring); infra Parts III and IV.
23 See infra Part V.
24 See, e.g., D.C Circuit Introduces "Mosaic Theory" of Fourth Amendment,
Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-
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concurrences' somewhat muddled, ultimately unsatisfying,
expression of privacy interests at stake in the case. What the court
is trying to capture is a concern with the ease with which private
facts historically obscured by the sheer cost of gathering them can
now be easily obtained by new surveillance technologies. 25 This is
not a discomfort with mosaics per se, but with the sudden erosion
of a privacy once taken for granted because it was expensive to
invade.26
The goal here is to provide a path forward by revealing the
analysis of reasonable expectation of privacy concerns that is
common to both concurrences. 27 The struggle in evidence in the
concurrences, and the Justices' sometimes incomplete attempts to
resolve conflicting views, can lead us to a better solution. The rule
that emerges from this exercise is faithful to the Fourth
Amendment's text, its original guiding principles, and to long-
standing precedent. At the same time, it is responsive to the
Justices' and the public's concern about radically evolving digital
technology and the growing powers it bestows on law
mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment
-search.
25 See infra Part IV.
26 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring) ("In the pre-computer
age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory,
but practical."); id at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("The net result is that
GPS monitoring-by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its
unfettered discretion, chooses to track-may 'alter the relationship between
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.' " (citing
United States v Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J.,
concurring))).
27 Though of course membership of the Court will change and opinions
evolve, making explicit what is implicit in the various opinions in a case is a
useful exercise engaged in by the Justices themselves to guide us moving
forward. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 109 n.2 (1998) (Ginsburg,
J. dissenting) ("While I agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that, under the
rule settled since Katz, the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy controls,
not the visitor's status as social guest, invitee, licensee, or business partner, I
think it noteworthy that five Members of the Court would place under the Fourth
Amendment's shield, at least, 'almost all social guests.' " (internal citations
omitted)).
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enforcement.
The endpoint is a rule both more limited and broader than a
simple application of a "mosaic theory." It is more limited in the
sense that the rule applies only to surveillance using technology
that operates outside of individual human control and is thus
susceptible to overuse and abuse.28 It is broader in the sense that it
finds surveillance intrusive not just where the technology will
collect a mosaic of information that reveals more than each single
tile of information itself, but where the technology will chill
expression of constitutionally protected behavior-behavior that
can take place "in public" with other people, but is shared with a
limited group.29
In Part II, this Article reviews the majority opinion and the
concurrences for those less familiar with the case. In Part III, the
Article examines the privacy concerns of the five concurring
Justices, highlighting their limited reliance on the mosaic theory
and the breadth of their privacy concerns. It closes by identifying
holes in the mosaic theory that reveal its limitations. In Part IV,
the Article reviews evidence of the concurring Justices' central
concerns reflected in the opinions and at oral argument and reveals
the Justices' use of constitutional text and original principles to
interpret the Fourth Amendment's application to modern
surveillance technology, a method of constitutional interpretation
identified as "living originalism" by Jack Balkin.30 By focusing us
on constitutional principles, living originalism reveals the guiding
principles central to both concurrences. These principles, more
than any narrow "rule" (like a rule against mosaics) must be at the
heart of what is extracted from the concurrences to guide us in the
future. Finally in Part V, the Article demonstrates that an
overemphasis on the mosaic theory's role in the concurrences'
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis has also led Jones's
critics off-track. Placing mosaics in their proper place and
identifying the limiting principles as a required component of the
28 See generally infra Part IV.
29 See generally infra Part IV.
30 See Jack Balkin, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 2011).
563SPRING 2013]
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
concurrences' analyses upends the conventional criticisms of the
Jones concurrences made in greatest detail by Orin Kerr in his
article, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment.'
II. THE OPINION AND THE CONCURRENCES
United States v. Jones concerned whether the actions of agents
who installed a GPS tracking device on a suspect's Jeep and used
the device for twenty-eight days to track the vehicle's movements
constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.32 The tracking device communicated with multiple
satellites to track the Jeep's location within fifty to one hundred
feet and then forwarded the location data wirelessly to a
government computer without further human involvement." The
device sent more than two thousand pages of data over the four-
week period.34 Amicus briefs before the Court explained that GPS
surveillance technology is rapidly becoming even more accurate
than the device used to track the defendant."
The defendant challenged the attachment and use of the
tracking device without a proper warrant 36 as an unconstitutional
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Government
countered that Supreme Court precedent precluded that argument,"
31 Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. LAW
REV. 311 (2012).
32 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 946 (2012).
33 id.
34 Id. at 948.
35 See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
and Legal Scholars and Technical Experts in Support of the Respondent, Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 4564007. Current systems enable an
average accuracy of one to three meters; systems designed to achieve ten
centimeters horizontal and twenty centimeters vertical accuracy are in
development. See Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How
Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth
Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J. ON. 177,
189-90 (2011) (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
36 The agents in this case actually obtained a warrant that authorized
installation of the device in DC within ten days. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. They
then proceeded to install the device on the eleventh day, in Maryland. Id.
3 Id. at 951 (discussing government contentions).
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pointing especially to United States v. Knotts." Knotts rejected a
Fourth Amendment challenge to human surveillance conducted by
agents in vehicles tracking suspects with the aid of "beepers"
attached to their cars." The Government relied heavily on a
general statement in Knotts that "[a] person travelling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another."4 0
A. The Court's Opinion and Revival of the Physical Trespass
Theory of Search
The Court in Jones held that "the Government's installation of
a GPS tracking device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that
device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 'search' "
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 4 In a valiant effort
to apply his originalist methodology to a technology creating
powers this author suspects the Founders would have considered
either God-like or, more likely, Satanic, Justice Scalia equated the
placement of a GPS device on a car to a constable who hides
himself in a target's coach in order to track its movements.42 He
noted that both the contemporary agent placing the GPS device and
this eighteenth century "tiny constable," as Alito sarcastically
labels him in his concurrence objecting to Scalia's analysis,43
"engage[] in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area
in order to obtain information."" Because "[t]here is no doubt that
the information gained by that trespassory activity would be the
product of an unlawful search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted,4 5 so too the placement of the
GPS device is a search. Justice Scalia's opinion was joined
without further comment by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
" 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
'
9 Id. at 285.
40 Id. at 281.
41 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949, 951.
42 Id. at 950 n.3.
43 Id. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring).
"Id. at 951 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
45 Id. at 950 n.3.
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Kennedy and Thomas.46
The Court's reliance on the physical trespass test for a search,
the test used exclusively until the latter half of the twentieth
century, 47 allowed the Court to evade the central question posed by
the case-that is, whether law enforcement's use of GPS
surveillance to track movements in public space is a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes because it violates one's "reasonable
expectation of privacy. "48 This reasonable expectation of privacy
test was set out in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United
States4 9 and has been applied by the Court ever since. 5
Reliance on the physical trespass test also revived a doctrine
many had left for dead. In Katz, the Court specifically rejected the
view that a physical trespass was necessary to establish a search,
holding that wiretapping of a public phone booth constituted a
search because the police violated the privacy of the defendant,
even where no trespass was involved."' Justice Scalia argued in
Jones, however, that the Court did not throw out the baby with the
bath water. The physical trespass test, according to the Court in
46 See id at 947.
47 See id. at 949-50 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001));
Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004).
48 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court's reasoning
largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of
long-term tracking) .... ).
49 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1973) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Jones, 132
S. Ct. at 950 (noting that after Katz, the Court's cases "applied the privacy
analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in [Katz], which said that a violation
occurs when government officers violate a person's 'reasonable expectation of
privacy' ").
50 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of
thermal imaging technology violated reasonable expectation of privacy); Katz,
389 U.S. at 361.
s See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding "the underpinnings of Olmstead and
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass'
doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling," and
reversing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding no
search where officers tapped public phone wires because there was no physical
trespass)).
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Jones, is a constitutional minimum,12 and "the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for
[it]."5
Justice Scalia distinguished precedent holding that "actual
trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient" to constitute a search.54
He argued that this case does not involve a trespass by itself; it
involves a trespass accompanied by the collection of evidence in a
criminal investigation-a trespass done for law enforcement
purposes." This is a tempting argument. It is true that a trespass
by law enforcement that was merely obnoxious, but not done to
gather evidence-imagine a police officer putting a sticker for the
policeman's ball on your car windshield-would not be a search
because it was not done to collect information." But this proves
too little. The question is whether trespass to collect information
should be enough to turn a trespass into a search or whether
something additional should be required. That question is beyond
the scope of this Article. It will have to suffice here to say that
after Jones, a trespass done to collect information is enough to
make the trespass a search.
Finally, Justice Scalia countered Justice Alito's suggestion that
"it is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that
52 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 ("What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee
against unreasonable searches, which we believe must provide at a minimum the
degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.... [U]nlike the
concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass
the exclusive test.").
" Id. at 952.
54 Id. at 964 n.5 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)).
5 See id.
56 See id. (noting that trespass alone would not constitute search, but trespass
and use of the device to gather information together created search); id. at 958
(Alito, J., concurring) ("It is clear that the attachment of the GPS device was not
itself a search; if the device had not functioned or if the officers had not used it,
no information would have been obtained."); id at 961 ("Attaching ... an object
[like the GPS tracking device] is generally regarded as so trivial that it does not
provide a basis for recovery under modem tort law." (citing Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts § 14, at 87 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)
(noting that harmless or trivial contact with personal property not actionable))).
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are analogous to what took place in this case," 7 by adopting
Justice Alito's sarcastic example of a tiny constable hidden in a
very large coach." He goes on then to dismiss this concern
altogether, stating that "it is quite irrelevant whether there was an
18th-century analog. Whatever new methods of investigation may
be devised, our task, at a minimum, is to decide whether the action
in question would have constituted a 'search' within the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.""
B. The Alito Four and Sotomayor
In Justice Alito's concurrence, the Alito four rejected the
physical trespass theory, complaining that the Court had not
explained how the attachment or use of the GPS device fits within
the textual bar on "unreasonable searches and seizures."60 Justice
Alito wrote that the application of "18th-century tort law" to
twenty-first century surveillance techniques "strain[ed] the
language of the Fourth Amendment; ... ha[d] little if any support
in current Fourth Amendment case law; and ... [was] highly
artificial."" He analogized the Court's reasoning under the
trespass-based rule in Jones to the Court's early decisions
involving wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, which
depended on a technical trespass accompanied by a gathering of
evidence to establish a search.62 Justice Alito quoted from a 1942
1 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
58 Id. at 964 n.3 ("[Justice Alito] posits a situation that is not far afield-a
constable's concealing himself in the target's coach in order to track its
movements.... There is no doubt that the information gained by that
trespassory activity would be the product of an unlawful search ....
59 Id. (emphasis in original).
60 Id. at 958 (pointing out that the Court holds attachment is a search, but does
not contend it is a seizure and arguing it could not be because there was no
"meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that
property") (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
61 Id.
62 See id. at 959-60 (comparing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509
(1961) (electronic surveillance was a search because microphone made physical
contact with a heating duct on the other side of a shared wall) with Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (no search occurred where phones were
tapped by tapping lines in the streets near the house)).
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dissent which criticized the physical trespass rule by noting that
"the search of one's home or office no longer requires physical
entry, for science has brought forth far more effective devices for
the invasion of a person's privacy than the direct and obvious
methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears and
which inspired the Fourth Amendment."6 3
It was recognition of the inadequacy of the trespass rule,
Justice Alito argued, that led the Court in Katz to adopt the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, protecting "people, not
places," as the Constitution's text required.' Justice Alito
appeared concerned that reverting to the trespass rule to address
technology that, like wiretapping, can be activated without
physical trespass, could result in a ruling as flawed as Olmstead.
He concurred in the judgment, but insisted that the Court must
address the Katz test, and concluded that "prolonged" GPS
surveillance by law enforcement is a search subject to the warrant
requirement because it violates a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
This leaves Justice Sotomayor in the unfamiliar role of swing
Justice. She joined the Scalia four, allowing the physical trespass
rule to carry the day.66 But Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to
stress that "Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law
trespassory test that preceded it," a test she agreed is an
"irreducible constitutional minimum . She recognized that
"[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic
63 Id. at 959 (quoting Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139, (1942)
(Murphy, J., dissenting)) (internal quotations omitted).
6 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); U.S. CONsT. amend.
IV (stating that the people of the United States are to be "secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures").
65 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
66 See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion
because I agree that a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
occurs, at a minimum, '[w]here, as here, the Government obtains information by
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.' " (internal citation
omitted)).
67 Id. at 955.
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signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis""
and will "affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal
privacy expectations."6 She made clear that she agreed with
Justice Alito that "at the very least, 'longer term GPS monitoring
in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.' "7o She also indicated that she might go even further than
Justice Alito: "In cases involving even short-term monitoring,
some unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz
analysis will require particular attention.""
III. TRESPASS, TILES, AND MOSAICS: PRIVACY AFTER JONES
At the time Jones was decided, the FBI was engaged in GPS
surveillance without warrants of over three thousand people.72
Because "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions,"" and because Jones
held that placement of GPS devices constitutes a search, after
Jones, it is clear that the government cannot place GPS devices on
private vehicles for the purposes of surveillance without a warrant,
unless such placement falls within one of the well-delineated
68 Id. (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953) (internal quotations omitted).
69 Id.
70 Id. (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)).
71 Id.
72 See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off
3,000 Tracking Devices, ABC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:40 AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/supreme-court-ruling-prompts-fbi
-to-tum-off-3000-tracking-devices/; Kevin Johnson, FBI Cuts Back on GPS
Surveillance After Supreme Court Ruling, USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2012, 1:08
AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-03/fbi-
gps-surveillance-supreme-court-ruling/52992842/1.
7 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted),
and other cases cited supra note 2; infra note 74.
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exceptions to the warrant rule.7 4  Accordingly, the FBI acted
decisively to stop its GPS surveillance of over three thousand
people initiated without warrants," and the Department of
Homeland Security issued new guidelines for GPS tracking,
including instructions on what to do with surveillance initiated
prior to the decision in Jones.76 However, where a government
agent does not physically place an object on a person's piece of
property but digitally connects with someone's property-cell-
phones, computers, GPS devices installed in cars at production or
by the owner-Jones's implications are murkier.
A. Trespassing Through Space
One possibility is that Scalia's physical trespass analysis
applies to digital trespass. After all, if an agent were to digitally
connect with your computer, GPS device, or mobile phone for
investigatory purposes, she is appropriating your property for
purposes of gathering evidence, just like the agents who placed the
tracker on your car. If we can invent tiny constables who hide in
your carriage, why not tiny constables who travel through wires?
Instead of hiding in the carriage, the tiny constable is hiding in
74 See Georgetown Law Journal Annual Review Criminal Procedure:
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 37,
37-38 (2005) ("[C]ertain kinds of searches and seizures are valid as exceptions
to the probable cause and warrant requirements, including investigatory
detentions, warrantless arrest, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizures of
items in plain view, searches and seizures justified by exigent circumstances,
consent searches, searches of vehicles, searches of containers, inventory
searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches
in which the special needs of law enforcement make the probable cause and
warrant requirements impracticable.").
7 See de Vogue, supra note 72.
76 For current federal law enforcement guidance, see FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. V.
JONES (UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION REGARDING GPS TRACKING)
CASE NOTE 3, available at http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-
division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by-subject/4th-amendment/Case
NoteUSvJones.pdf/view (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) ("For current
investigations/cases involving warrantless GPS tracking, . . . [s]top the tracking
and get a warrant.").
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digital form in your cell phone, your Internet browser, or your
car's previously installed GPS device. This is not like Katz where
the trespass was only on public wires. The trespass invades your
own personal effects.
The Government will undoubtedly vigorously defend against
this position and the courts will have to decide whether there is a
significant difference between digital invasion of your personal
property and "physical" trespass by human touch. Justice
Sotomayor at least seems to view digital invasion as different from
physical trespass and so as not implicating that theory of search.7
A statement in the Court's opinion also raises a question about the
receptivity of the Scaliafour to application of the trespass theory to
digital invasions. The Court contrasts the Jones situation involving
physical placement of a device on a car by a human with "cases
that do not involve physical contact, such as those that involve the
transmission of electronic signals."7 ' Rather than being subject to
the trespass theory, the Court writes, these "[s]ituations involving
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass
would remain subject to Katz analysis." 7
However, because the Court did not directly address whether a
digital trespass would be considered a "physical[] occup[ation] [of]
private property for the purpose of obtaining information,"so it is
possible that the Court's view could evolve, especially with a
stronger understanding of technology and the way digital
surveillance invades your personal property, takes control of it, and
makes it communicate with the third party interloper about your
activities. After all, tiny constables in mailboxes or the pockets of
the Pony Express are just as probable as tiny constables in horse-
drawn carriages. The analogy might convince Justice Scalia that
digital trespass-even wireless digital trespass-that invades your
7 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) ("In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do
not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion's
trespassory test may provide little guidance.").
78 Id. at 953 (majority opinion).
7 Id. (emphasis in original).
80 See id at 949.
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computer, your email, your browser, or your hard drive is no less
"physical," and no less invasive, than the human kind. But there is
another way to skin this cat: Finding the commonality between the
two concurrences can help us determine how the concurring five
Justices would rule using a reasonable expectation of privacy test.
B. Of Mosaics and Individual Tiles
As noted above, the lower court's opinion in Jones relied
heavily on the mosaic theory. As the D.C. Circuit noted:
A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a
record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route,
destination, and each place he stops and how long he stays there; rather,
he expects each of those movements to remain "disconnected and
anonymous." 8'
Similarly, Chief Judge Kozinski relied on an aggregation theory in
his powerful opinion dissenting from the Ninth Circuit's denial of
rehearing en banc in United States v. Pineda-Moreno, a case that,
like Jones, challenged GPS surveillance without a warrant and that
was in front of the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari at the
same time as Jones." He explained his belief that GPS
surveillance violated a reasonable expectation of privacy:
By tracking and recording the movements of millions of individuals the
government can use computers to detect patterns and develop
suspicions. It can also learn a great deal about us because where we go
says much about who we are.. .. Were Jones, Aaronson and
Rutherford at that protest outside the White House?8 4
Despite this emphasis on aggregation in both cases, as well as
commentary in the blogosphere about "mosaics," both
concurrences steered clear of explicitly adopting the mosaic or
aggregation labels to explain the invasiveness of GPS surveillance.
Most tellingly, they fail to cite either the core argument in the
lower court's opinion in Maynard quoted above, or Chief Judge
81 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J.,
concurring)).
82 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).3Id. at 1121.
84 Id. at 1125 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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Kozinski's dissent." Still, although the opinions are sparse and
their conceptions of privacy embryonic, the privacy concerns of
the five concurring Justices emerge underneath and around their
discomfort in their opinions. As will be shown below, they lean on
the mosaic theory but evidence a broader concern about privacy.
Justice Sotomayor provided the most extensive analysis of the
privacy interests at stake and the particular reasons GPS
surveillance intrudes on those interests, coming closest to heeding
Justice Scalia's call in Kyllo v. United States" to adopt a rule that
would "take account of more sophisticated [surveillance] systems
that are already in use or in development."" Justice Sotomayor
focuses on the nature and capacities of the technology itself and
identifies how these capacities of GPS change the nature of
surveillance as we know it." She uses the idea that an aggregation
of data adds to the intrusiveness of this type of surveillance.89 She
notes that "[i]n cases involving even short-term monitoring, some
unique attributes of GPS surveillance . . . require particular
attention. GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive
record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of
detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations."9 0 She also writes, "I would ask whether
people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded
and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs,
sexual habits, and so on."9
But despite these nods to the mosaic, Justice Sotomayor's
85 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 954 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
86 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
87 Id. at 36; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I
would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering
the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one's
public movements.").
88 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). See generally
Smith et al., supra note 35 (discussing unique powers of GPS surveillance).
8 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 955.
9' Id. at 956.
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concerns are broader. She highlights the "indisputably private
nature" of information that can be discovered on individual trips to
a "psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the
by-the-hour motel, the union meeting [hall], the [houses of
worship], the gay bar . .. ."92 She also suggests a more
fundamental change in the jurisprudence to "reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties."93 Justice
Sotomayor notes that the third party rule is "ill suited to the digital
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks,"94 questioning the notion at the heart of this rule that
"secrecy [is] a prerequisite for privacy." 9 5
Similarly, Justice Alito's concurrence seemed to harbor
concerns running deeper than the mosaic problem. Although he
echoed the main criticisms of the reasonable expectation of privacy
92 Id. at 955 (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
93 Id. at 957.
94 id.
95 Id. Here, Justice Sotomayor is reflecting the concerns of privacy scholars
presented in an Amicus Brief submitted to the Court. Brief for Yale Law School
Information Society Project Scholars and Other Experts in the Law of Privacy
and Technology Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259),
2011 WL 4614429, at *34-35 (citing, for example, Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy
as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 139 (2004) ("[The] notion that
when individuals venture out in public . . . 'anything goes,' is pure fiction. ...
[E]ven in the most public of places, it is not out of order for people to respond
... 'none of your business,' to a stranger asking their names."); Daniel J.
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1087, 1152 (2002)
("Clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy would mean the practical
extinction of privacy in today's world.").
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test, citing the circularity problem in particular,16 he then punted:
"The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine,"" which he described as "ask[ing] whether
the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.""
He argued that "the use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy," because "society's expectation has been that law
enforcement agents and others would not-and indeed, in the
main, simply could not-secretly monitor and catalogue every
single movement of an individual's car for a very long period."99
By contrast, GPS "[d]evices like the one used in the present case
... make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap."'"
Despite ample support for the mosaic test in Maynard, Justice
Alito, like Justice Sotomayor, does not cite to Maynard's analysis.
Nor does he specify whether the problem with monitoring and
tracking of "every single movement" of your car' is that the
government will have a mosaic of information about you or, in
96 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962. For a discussion of the circularity problem,
see Smith et al., supra note 35, at 194-95. In that paper, the authors reject an
interpretation of "the 'expectation of privacy' criterion [that] creates the
paradoxical situation in which law enforcement overreach is legitimized once it
becomes routinized." Id. That cannot be the proper interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. If it were, at the time the Amendment was adopted, the general
warrant, the very instrument of government abuse to which the Amendment was
directed, would not have violated a reasonable expectation of privacy. It was,
after all, being used indiscriminately and so the "reasonable" expectation would
have been that it could be used against you.
97 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
98 Id. (emphasis added). By focusing on intrusiveness, he echoes concerns of
other scholars whose work was before the Court, such as Susan Freiwald, Renee
Hutchins, and Christopher Slobogin. See Brief for Yale Law School
Information Society Project Scholars and Other Experts in the Law of Privacy
and Technology, supra note 93, at 34-35 nn.105 & 109. See generally Paul
Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701 (2010) (describing our mistaken belief
in the anonymization of data and its impact on privacy law).
99 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
'"o Id.
101 Id.
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addition, whether the prolonged tracking is intrusive because it
increases the likelihood that you will be watched doing something
private. Justice Alito is more concerned about the ease with which
this type of surveillance can take place using GPS, than he is with
the fact that it creates a more detailed picture of what you are
doing. 1O2
C. The Case of the Mosaic and the Trip to the Proverbial Gay Bar
Given the adoption by the lower court of the mosaic test for
violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy and scholarly
support for the test, one might wonder why the concurring Justices
do not simply endorse it wholeheartedly. The reason is that
reliance on the mosaic test alone to determine when a reasonable
expectation of privacy has been violated would not fully describe
the privacy invasions of an overly permeating surveillance. 3 To
illustrate the holes in the mosaic, we will start with a timeless
scenario more inclined to capture the fancy of the younger
generation than our dated references to Orwell and a date long
past. (After all, many current law students were not even born in
1984.)
Imagine that Chancellor Palpatine-the Star Wars character
and virtuous Senator from Naboo who is really the evil Darth
Sidious in disguisel0 4-Sets out to discredit the Jedi and their puny
Senate supporters so that he can monopolize power. He orders a
tracking device that relays information back to giant computers
that produce reports about the Jedi's locations to be placed on all
their space ships. He discovers Anakin's relationship with Senator
Amidala, that Obi Wan buys and sells bulk cartons of "death
sticks" despite being a spokesperson against them, and that Senator
Amidala (despite her relationship with Anakin) also frequents a
102 See id.
103 See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment provides our primary protection against "a too permeating
police surveillance" and abuse of police authority).
104 See STAR WARS EPISODE 1: THE PHANTOM MENACE (20th Century Fox
1999); Palpatine, WOOKIEEPEDIA: THE STAR WARS WIKI,
http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Palpatine (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
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lesbian bar called Sisters with some friends from her planet Naboo.
He also finds out that Mace Windu and Yoda take out their
spaceships and speed through Coruscant's back alleys for fun. He
uses this information to undermine his targets and turn them
against each other. All the characters resist his blackmail, except
for one: Anakin.
This all may seem far-fetched. After all, Jedi are trained in the
ways of the force. But here on Planet Earth, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged:
History abundantly documents the tendency of Government-however
benevolent and benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who
most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections
become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance
may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs."o0
Given past and current United States government programs of
surveillance, 06 it is not difficult to imagine an executive branch
los United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
106 See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41780, THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS 24
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf; Alexander
Charns, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 17-18, 24-31, 52 (1992) (describing instances of FBI
wiretapping throughout history); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1309 (2004)
(examining history of surveillance abuses before 1978); Ken Dilanian, FBI
Involved in Hundreds of Violations in National Security Investigations, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/30/nation/la-na-fbi-
violations-20110130 (" 'The documents suggest,' the report says, 'that FBI
intelligence investigations have compromised the civil liberties of American
citizens far more frequently, and to a greater extent, than was previously
assumed.' "); Anjali Dalal, Administrative Constitutionalism and the Re-
entrenchment of Surveillance Culture 8 (Mar. 4, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2236502 (citing SENATE
SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, UNITED STATES
SENATE, BOOK II, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 6-7 (1976), available at
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94th/94755_II.pdf (describing FBI's
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devoted to a "culture of life" targeting the litigating staff attorneys
at the Center for Reproductive Rights, hypothetically discovering
that fifty percent of them are gay, twenty-five percent are Muslim,
and one of them has fathered three children by three different
women. They use the information in various ways to undermine
the Center's litigation and public education efforts. On the other
side of the aisle, imagine the Obama Administration puts tracking
devices on Paul Ryan and his staff members, including a number
of them who are "pro-life," i.e., anti-abortion leaders in their
communities. Hypothetically, the Administration discovers that
Paul Ryan works out at a gay gym and his staff members visit an
abortion clinic during hours when procedures are performed and
no protests are underway. The Administration then uses this
information to discredit them.
There are, in fact, documented contemporary instances of more
widespread surveillance as well, mostly coming out of China."'
Under these systems of surveillance, surveillance technology is
used on large swaths of people and information gathered can be
accessed whenever desired by government agents."' This type of
surveillance is reminiscent of the general warrants the Fourth
Amendment was designed to curtail. "
Counterintelligence Program which "developed over 500,000 domestic
intelligence files on American and domestic groups including the NAACP, the
Women's Liberation Movement, and the Conservative American Christian
Action Council")); .
107 See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4
Months, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/
technology/chinese-hackers-infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html?pagewan
ted=all&_r-0 ("The mounting number of attacks that have been traced back to
China suggest that hackers there are behind a far-reaching spying campaign
aimed at an expanding set of targets including corporations, government
agencies, activist groups and media organizations inside the United States.");
William Gerrity, The Ultimate Invasion of Privacy, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2013, 1:29
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future tense/2013/02/new york
times security breech how a chinese hacker tried to blackmail me.html
(describing "[h]ow a Chinese hacker used my private nickname, personal
emails, and sensitive documents to try to blackmail me").
109 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 & n.21 (1980); Camara
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These scenarios show that the mosaic theory does some good
work in explaining the invasiveness of super-surveillance. For
example, it captures the creepiness of an all-seeing government,
the idea that Big Brother can watch you all the time from satellites
or track you through your computers and cell phones. It considers
the implications of government appropriation of those handy
cameras and FaceTime or Skype apps. It connects not only
Amidala's relationship with Anakin but also her visits to the
lesbian bar that she has not told Anakin about. Enabling the
aggregation of the "tiles" adds to the intrusiveness of the
surveillance. It might be worse than non-aggregation by making
someone an even better target for blackmail or other coercion. The
government could find out that you are gay, and purchase
pornography, and are a Tea Party member. The collection of
information, this picture of who you are, especially given the ways
the government can keep and track and analyze this data for an
unlimited time period, comparing and contrasting your behavior
with those of others, gives the government a more complete sense
of who you are than anyone would naturally get."o As the court
below held: "What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may
appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the
scene."'
But the mosaic does not tell the whole story. Aggregation of
this enormous amount of data is not the only problem with
surveillance by GPS. It may not even be the most important
problem with it. The most common examples of the technology's
intrusiveness involve the possibility that certain information will
be obtained-information that is found on just one "tile" in the
v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (Fourth Amendment designed to
protect "against arbitrary invasions"); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547, 741 (1999).
110 See generally Rende McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REv. 409 (2007)
(discussing how increases in GPS technology allow law enforcement to observe
suspects for a longer period of time, using less resources).
' United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal
citation omitted) (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)), af'd in part
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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mosaic and that can be gathered from just one trip. Just learning of
Senator Amidala's meetings with Anakin at their secret love nest,
just knowing about her trip to the lesbian bar, just being aware of
Paul Ryan's visit to the gay gym, or discovering the anti-choice
leader who goes to an abortion clinic on a procedure day: Any one
of these individual facts could be something someone is trying to
keep secret, and its discovery is highly invasive. The Justices do
not completely jump on the mosaic bandwagon because they share
a broader concern that Government spying could lead to a world in
which the government needs only to run a quick search through the
database to find something-just one thing-you wish it had not
seen.
IV. APPLYING ORIGINAL ANALOGUE TEXT AND PRINCIPLES
TO AN EVOLVING DIGITAL WORLD
Simply describing what private information can be discovered
through GPS surveillance did not resolve the concerns of the
Justices though. They struggled because the nature of the
technology here is so different from anything they have addressed
before. To create a proper analogy, Scalia would need to imagine
not just one tiny constable, but millions of sleeping tiny constables
in every "coach" in the land, just waiting to be awakened by
Sauron watching through Saruman in his Tower.112 As their oral
argument questions and opinions reveal, the five concurring
Justices reached back to original principles to guide them through
these strange woods.
A. Originalism Is Born Again
By applying original principles to a completely modern reality,
the concurrences use a method of analysis that is faithful to
constitutional text and to original principles of the Constitution.
Jack Balkin recently identified this method of interpretation and
.12 Sauron is the primary antagonist and titular character of J.R.R. Tolkien's
THE LORD OF THE RINGS, and Sarumon is the Wizard through whom he acts.
Sauron, LORD OF THE RINGS WIKI, http://Iotr.wikia.com/wiki/Sauron (last
visited May 10, 2013); Saruman, LORD OF THE RINGS WIKI,
http://lotr.wikia.com/wiki/Saruman (last visited May 10, 2013).
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construction in his influential new book Living Originalism."'
Examining the concurring Justices' approaches through the lens of
living originalism helps to expose the limiting principles that will
continue to guide the Court's jurisprudence in this rapidly
changing area. It also helps us evaluate, and ultimately reject,
claims that the reasoning in the Jones concurrences is untethered
from the constitutional text and represents a "maj or departure from
the traditional mode of Fourth Amendment analysis."ll4
This Article will not add to the considerable commentary on
living originalism."' Some explanation is necessary, though, to
demonstrate why living originalism is a useful framework to
uncover the rule proposed by the otherwise elusive concurrences.
One of living originalism's central achievements is what David
Strauss calls its reclamation project,"' because it seeks to wrest
originalism from those who guard it jealously for themselves.'"
Balkin rejects the view that originalism, defined as the idea that
"the requirements of the Constitution were fixed, at least in crucial
113 JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALIsM 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 2011).
114 Kerr, The Mosaic Theory, supra note 31, at 315-20. Kerr argues that the
"mosaic theory poses a fundamental challenge to the sequential approach" to
search analysis under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 320. This sequential
approach "takes a snapshot of each discrete step and assesses whether that
discrete step at that discrete time constitutes a search." Id. at 314. He then
argues that "much of the Supreme Court's case law on the reasonable
expectation of privacy test can be understood as distinguishing between inside
and outside surveillance." Id. at 316. "To know if a search has occurred, courts
ask if the government's conduct has crossed the boundary from outside to inside
surveillance." Id. at 317; see discussion infra Part V.
115 See generally Originalism and Living Constitutionalism: A Symposium on
Jack Balkin's Living Originalism and David Strauss's The Living Constitution,
92 B.U. L. REV. 1127 (2012); Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living
Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815 (2012) (responding to papers presented at
conference on living originalism).
11 David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1161
(2012) (arguing that Balkin's work is a "reclamation" project as much as a
project of reconciliation).
117 Id. at 1161-62 (describing the reclamation project as an "effort to show
that progressive principles can be justified on originalist grounds," but arguing
that the project succeeds only "by treating originalism not as a way of resolving
constitutional issues but rather as a rhetorical resource").
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respects, at the times that its respective provisions were
adopted,""' and "living constitutionalism," the view that the
Constitution is a living document that adapts to changing
circumstance, are necessarily irreconcilable."9
First, he identifies, foregrounds, and encourages the originalist
impulses already at work in "living constitutionalism" by mooring
constitutional interpretation explicitly in both the text and
underlying principles of the Constitution itself-its original
meanings.'2 0 In this way, he defuses one of the major criticisms of
living constitutionalism, that is, the claim that it is undemocratic
because it relies on the whims of nine Justices, rather than the will
of the people expressed through the Constitution itself.'2 '
Second, Balkin also reveals that Justice Scalia's version of
originalism is actually a disguised form of living originalism.
Justice Scalia does not faithfully apply the view that "the way that
the adopting generation would have expected the relevant
constitutional principles to be articulated and applied should
govern today."' 22 Instead, as even he admits, Justice Scalia is a
"faint-hearted originalist" who adopts these views when he can
" 1d. at 1161.
1' BALKIN, supra note 113, at 7; Strauss, supra note 116, at 1161-63 (citing
BALKIN, supra note 113, at 3-7). But see Katie Glueck, Antonin Scalia: The
Constitution is 'Dead', POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2013, 8:26 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01 /scalia-the-constitution-is-dead-86853 .h
tml#ixzz2Kpzs9xzv.
120 See Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1129, 1130 (2012); cf DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 2-3 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2010) (arguing that our "constitutional system ... has become a
common law system, one in which precedent and past practices are, in their own
way, as important as the written U.S. Constitution itself' and that this allows us
to have a "constitution that is both living, adapting, and changing and,
simultaneously, invincibly stable and impervious to human manipulation").
121 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
852-55 (1989) (criticizing "nonoriginalists" and arguing that "[i]f the
Constitution were ... a novel invitation to apply current societal values, what
reason would there be to believe that the invitation was addressed to the courts
rather than to the legislature?").
122 Strauss, supra note 116, at 1163 (quoting BALKIN, supra note 113, at 7)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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stomach them.123  When changing public norms or changing
conditions of technology make original applications too horrific or
insufficient, 12 4 he is happy to reject those applications.'2 5
Sometimes when Justice Scalia has a particular view of a situation,
as he clearly did here, he has to work very hard to fit his result into
his view of originalism, imagining hobbit-sized or smaller
constables, who could fit into a coach without detection.'2 6
By drawing these two traditions towards each other, Balkin
reveals and promotes an interpretive method that maintains:
[F]idelity to the original meaning of the Constitution, and in particular,
to the rules, standards, and principles stated by the Constitution's text.
It also requires us to ascertain and to be faithful to the principles that
123 BALKIN, supra note 113, at 8 (citing inter alia Scalia, supra note 121, at
862-64).
124 As Balkin points out, "The basic problem with looking to original expected
application for guidance is that it is inconsistent with so much of our existing
constitutional traditions." BALKIN, supra note 113, at 8. These include such
notions about federal power and the ability of the federal Government to protect
women and the disabled from private discrimination, not to mention
constitutional guarantees of sex equality for married women, racial equality, the
right to use contraceptives and much of modem First Amendment doctrine. Id.
125 For example, Scalia sounds much like a living originalist in Jones, where
he agrees that the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is appropriate
although it "has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference
to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society." United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
951 (2012) (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted). He also notes in Kyllo v. United States that:
We rejected . . . a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in
Katz, where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that
reached the exterior of the phone booth. Reversing that approach would
leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including
imaging technology-that could discern all human activity in the home.
While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule
we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already
in use or in development.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001).
126 As Justice Alito points out, to view GPS surveillance as something that
might have been possible in 1791, "would have required either a gigantic coach,
a very tiny constable, or both-not to mention a constable with incredible
fortitude and patience." Jones, 121 S. Ct. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring).
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underlie the text, and to build out constitutional constructions that best
apply the constitutional text and its associated principles in current
circumstances. 127
Thus understood, the concurring opinions in Jones reflect living
originalism at its finest. This Part traces the Court's interpretive
process from the oral argument through the concurring opinions to
reveal the two limiting principles that were applied in Jones and
will be applied in the future to evaluate other surveillance
techniques: (1) Where a surveillance technique evades normal
constraints on abuse of law enforcement powers, the Fourth
Amendment requires that abuse must be otherwise constrained;
and (2) a surveillance technique that chills the exercise of protected
activities violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.
B. Principles That Protect Us from a Too-Permeating Police
Surveillance
In the oral argument, we see the Court struggle to extract from
the Government's lawyer a constitutional principle that will
explain their objections to unfettered use of the technology. 128
Their objections were clear as soon as the Chief Justice extracted
an affirmative response to the question, "You think there would
also not be a search if you put a GPS device on all of our cars,
monitored our movements for a month? You think you're entitled
to do that under your theory?" 29 As Justice Kagan said towards
the end of the argument:
I mean, if you think about this, and you think about a little robotic
device following you around 24 hours a day anyplace you go that's not
your home, reporting in all your movements to the police, to
investigative authorities, the notion that we don't have an expectation of
privacy in that, the notion that we don't think that our privacy interests
127 BALKIN, supra note 113, at 3.
128 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259),
2011 WL 5360051.
129 Id. at *9 (emphasis added). As Tamara Lave points out in her Article at
this Symposium, the judges tend to protect activities under the Fourth
Amendment when they can relate the intrusion to their own lives. Tamara Rice
Lave, Protecting Elites: An Alternative Take on How United States v. Jones Fits
into the Court's Technology Jurisprudence, 14 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 461 (2013)
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would be violated by this robotic device, I'm-I'm not sure how one
can say that. 130
Despite knowing in their hearts that this type of permeating
surveillance must be wrong, the Court was having difficulty
shoehorning their gut feelings about it into Fourth Amendment
doctrine.
At argument, the concurring Justices began a search for a
limiting principle that would distinguish between twenty-four-hour
surveillance by individual officers and twenty-four-hour
surveillance by machines, disconnected from human control in the
moment. As Breyer queried during argument:
The question that I think people are driving at, at least as I understand it
and certainly share the concern, is that if you win this case then there is
nothing to prevent the police or the government from monitoring 24
hours a day the public movement of every citizen of the United States.
And-and the difference between the monitoring and what happened in
the past is memories are fallible, computers aren't.
And no one, at least very rarely, sends human beings to follow
people 24 hours a day. That occasionally happens. But with the
machines, you can. .. . And so what protection is there, if any, once we
accept your view of the case, from this slight[ly] futuristic scenario
that's just been painted, and is done more so in their briefs?'3 '
A discussion then ensued about the possibility of using the
duration of the search as a limiting principle, with the suggestion
being that the Court could adopt a grey zone beyond which the
warrant requirement absolutely applied but before which it did
not.'32 Justice Breyer suggested that kind of limit might work and
has in fact worked in other situations where the Court "draw[s] an
outer limit, [and] say[s] you can't go beyond that," and leaves it
"for the lower courts to work out."' The government lawyer
objected that adopting a principle that "says 1 trip is okay but 30
trips is not, [provides] absolutely no guidance for law
enforcement" as to how to proceed in the grey zone."3 However,
130 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 128, at *57.
13 Id. at *12-13.
132 Id. at *14.
SId.
'34 d.
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the Government failed to offer the Court an alternative workable
Fourth Amendment principle and instead tried to deflect the
Court's attention to other constitutional principles that could be
used to bring civil challenges to permeating police surveillance
post hoc. '
Justice Ginsburg pushed back, bringing the lawyer back to the
constitutional text at issue and the reasonableness of the
Government's actions when tested against societal expectations.
She stated:
But the Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches
and seizures. And if I were to try to explain to someone, here is the
Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment says-or it has been
interpreted to mean that if I'm on a public bus and the police want to
feel my luggage, that's a violation, and yet this kind of monitoring,
installing the GPS and monitoring the person's movement whenever
they are outside their house in the car is not? It just-there is
something about it that, that just doesn't parse.
The Government lawyer's rejoinder focused on other government
actions the Court has held are outside the Fourth Amendment that
citizens might be similarly uncomfortable with:
I'm quite sure, Justice Ginsburg, that if you ask citizens whether the
police could freely pick up their trash for a month and paw through it
looking for evidence of a crime, or keep a record of every telephone
call that they made for the duration and the number that it went
through, or conduct intense visual surveillance of them, that citizens
would probably also find that to be [intrusive]. 37
While some of us might take the public's discomfort with
government looking through our trash and collecting records of our
phone calls without oversight by a coordinate branch as evidence
3 Id. at *23 ("[T]o answer in part Justice Breyer's earlier concern about
limiting principles, this Court recognized in the Whren decision that, although
the Fourth Amendment is not a restriction on discriminatory or arbitrary or
oppressive stops that are based on invidious characteristics, the Equal Protection
Clause is. The First Amendment also stands as a protection. If this Court
believes that there is an excessive chill created by an actual law or universal
practice of monitoring people through GPS, there are other constitutional
principles that are available.").
136 Id. at *23-24.
137 Id. at *24.
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of the failings of the Court's decisions in those cases,"' a sign that
the court went astray there, Justice Breyer jumped in to distinguish
precedent, rather than to trash it."' He pinpointed the difference
between these forms of surveillance conducted by police officers
and GPS surveillance.'40 As he noted, the government "won't and
probably couldn't physically" conduct this type of surveillance on
large amounts of people, while with GPS they could.14' This
begins to lead him to the principle for which he has searched.'42
He continued:
Start with the other end. Start, what would a democratic society look
like if a large number of people did think that the government was
tracking their every movement over long periods of time. And once
you reject that, you have to have a reason under the Fourth Amendment
and a principle. And what I'm looking for is the reason and the
principle that would reject that, but wouldn't also reject 24 hours a day
for 28 days. Do you see where I'm-that's what I'm listening very
hard to find.143
The Government lawyer responded that line-drawing is too hard
and the Court is better off dealing with a big brother situation after
it occurs, rather than preventing it from occurring in the first
place. 144 The Justices were not satisfied.
Justice Sotomayor inquired whether Jones did not in fact
present a case to address overly broad surveillance and then goes
on to point out the ease with which the government could already
138 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection at curb);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that the use of a pen register
to record phone numbers dialed infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy).
39 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 128, at *24.
40 Id.
14 1 id.
142 d.
14 3 id.
'4Id. at *24-25 ("First of all, I think the line-drawing problems that the Court
would create for itself would be intolerable, and better that the Court should
address the so-called 1984 scenarios if they come to pass rather than using this
case as a vehicle for doing so.").
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adopt a system of surveillance of large groups.' 45 Justice Alito
suggests that the most significant limitation on government
attempts to gather private information has been logistical:
It seems to me the heart of the problem that's presented by this case
and will be presented by other cases involving new technology is that
in the pre-computer, pre-Intemet age much of the privacy-I would say
most of the privacy-that people enjoyed was not the result of legal
protections or constitutional protections; it was the result simply of the
difficulty of traveling around and gathering up information.146
At this point, the five Justices who join in the view that GPS
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy seem to have hit on
their interpreting principles. As Sotomayor wrote in her
concurrence, the storage of records indefinitely and the ability to
mine the information forever, coupled with the cheapness and
surreptitiousness of the GPS technology allows law enforcement to
"evade[] the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and community
hostility.' ""' When the normal resource constraints no longer
apply, the Fourth Amendment requires that abuse must be
otherwise constrained.'4 8
A finding that a type of surveillance is particularly susceptible
145 Id. at *25 ("The GPS technology today is limited only by the cost of the
instrument, which frankly right now is so small that it wouldn't take that much
of a budget, local budget, to place a GPS on every car in the nation ... [a]lmost
every car has it now.").
146 1d. at * 10.
J4 ones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 US 419, 426 (2004)); see also id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)
(stating that the public's expectation is that "law enforcement . . . would not-
and indeed, in the main, simply could not-secretly monitor and catalogue every
single movement of an individual's car for a very long period").
148 See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 35, at 178-79 n.10, and accompanying
text; id. at 182 ("In cases from Katz to Knotts to Kyllo, wherever a new
technology carries the potential for police abuse, the Court has allowed its use
only as guarded by the warrant requirement, placing a check on the unlimited
discretion otherwise afforded officers. As the Supreme Court has
acknowledged, '[r]equiring a warrant will have the salutary effect of ensuring
that use of [new technology] is not abused.' " (quoting United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984))).
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to abuse would not be enough alone. If the Government could
abuse its ability to observe an individual doing things that they are
not seeking to keep private, for example an appearance on the
Today Show to publicize a new book, that would have no impact
on the individual's behavior. It would be hard to argue that the
practice constituted an unreasonable search in that instance. That
is why the second principle-identified by Justice Sotomayor-is
vital to identifying the Fourth Amendment violation. As she
explains, the harm of living in a surveillance society, a society
where technology is used to follow you anytime or all the time, is
the enormous chilling effect on people's associational and
expressive behavior: "Awareness that the Government may be
watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the
Government's unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal
private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse."l49 Ultimately,
these concerns led her to write:
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of
privacy in the sum of one's public movements.... I would also
consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the
absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable
to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment's goal to curb
arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent "a too permeating
police surveillance." 5 0
Thus, the concurrences' interpret the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against "unreasonable searches" in light of the original
purposes of the Fourth Amendment-to protect against police
abuse of law enforcement powers and the chilling impact on
protected behaviors that overuse of those powers would create.
What Jones tells us is that any use of the "mosaic" analysis applies
in the context of surveillance techniques that violate these original
principles.
141 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
50 d. (citation omitted).
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V. A RESPONSE TO THREE CRITICISMS
Finally, this Part will briefly respond to three criticisms of the
Jones concurrences raised by Orin Kerr-criticisms that stem from
an overemphasis on the role of the mosaic theory in the opinions.
Kerr expresses anxiety that the concurrences-read as reliant on
the "mosaic theory" and seemingly unlimited by anything else-
create confusion about how the Fourth Amendment's reasonable
expectation of privacy test will be applied to police investigatory
techniques, including, but not limited to, those involving new
technologies.'"' Most surprisingly, he expresses concern that the
Jones concurrences' rule that GPS surveillance violates a
reasonable expectation of privacy would also apply to prolonged
surveillance of suspects by individual officers because that
surveillance also violates the "mosaic theory."'52 But Professor
Kerr's narrow focus on mosaics to the exclusion of the limiting
principles advocated by all five concurring Justices means he
misses the bigger picture in his attempt to discredit Jones and the
warrant rule for GPS surveillance. Below, this Part will examine
three of Kerr's objections.
A. The Concurrences Do Not Break from Precedent
In an attempt to undercut Jones, Kerr complains, "The theory
[of the concurrences] is so different from what has come before
that implementing it would require the creation of a parallel set of
Fourth Amendment rules."' Kerr points out that "Fourth
Amendment analysis traditionally has followed ... the sequential
approach: to analyze whether government action constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search or seizure, courts take a snapshot of the
act and assess it in isolation."'5 4 He then describes Jones as using a
"novel" approach under which searches are aggregated and
evaluated as a whole, rather than evaluated step-by-step:
'1' Kerr, supra note 31, at 314 (arguing that "implementing the mosaic theory
would require courts to answer an extensive list of difficult and novel
questions").
152 Id. at 335.
'13 Id. at 329.
154 Id. at 315.
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The mosaic theory requires courts to apply the Fourth Amendment
search doctrine to government conduct as a collective whole rather than
in isolated steps. Instead of asking if a particular act is a search, the
mosaic theory asks whether a series of acts that are not searches in
isolation amount to a search when considered as a group.is'
But Kerr is either setting up a straw man for attack or simply has a
"missing the forest for the trees" problem. His analysis fails to
comprehend the vital difference between human surveillance and
surveillance by machine. With GPS, the police officers' control
over what will be searched ends with placement of the GPS device.
The discrete step is the attachment of the GPS device and then the
machines take over. The target may move from place to place, but
the "search" continues without a chance for a separate evaluation
of police action. The Government conduct simply cannot be
broken down into individual "sequential" steps once the machine
takes over.
B. Under the Concurrences, Human Surveillance Aggregating
Information Is Fundamentally Different from GPS Surveillance
Kerr has also suggested that the Jones concurrences stand for
the proposition that any search method that would gather a
"mosaic" of information about a target, including information
collected by visual surveillance by individual officers, would
constitute a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, and therefore
that prolonged human surveillance might now require a warrant.'5 6
This would be true if the concurrences were advocating a rule that
any surveillance method that collected a mosaic of information
about a person violated a reasonable expectation of privacy. But as
shown above in Part IV, they did not. Only surveillance methods
that are subject to widespread abuse and that would create a
chilling effect on constitutionally protected behaviors invade the
iss Id. at 320; see also id. at 328 (complaining that Sotomayor applies "the
language of sums from the mosaic theory, not the language of individual acts
from the sequential approach").
156 Id. at 335 ("If the police send a team of investigators to place the suspect
under visual surveillance, should that visual surveillance be subject to the same
analysis?").
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reasonable expectation of privacy.' Once again, Kerr is reading
the concurrences too broadly, ignoring the lengths to which the
concurrences go to limit their ruling to technology that has the
awe-inspiring power to follow any or every person twenty-four
hours a day for any (or no) reason whatsoever, and ignoring the
difference technology makes."' Human surveillance by definition
is not susceptible to the type of abuse with which the concurrences
are concerned, that is, surveillance abuse allowed by technology
freeing surveillance from human resource limitations. For now, at
least until we create an enormous clone police force creating the
possibility of an "overly permeating police surveillance""
conducted by people, human visual surveillance will not be a
search under the reasoning of the concurrences because it simply
does not possess the characteristics that make GPS surveillance
troubling.'" As the majority reaffirmed, "our cases suggest that
such visual observation is constitutionally permissible."61
C. Defining "Prolonged" Surveillance Is an Appropriate Line-
Drawing Function for the Lower Courts
In this case the concurrences adopted the approach suggested
by Justice Breyer in oral argument, as discussed above. They
argued that GPS surveillance lasting four weeks was lengthy
enough to impinge on society's expectation of privacy, thus
constituting a search.162  It was not necessary, they wrote, "to
1 See generally supra Part IV.
5 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)); see also id.
at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the public's expectation is that "law
enforcement ... would not-and indeed, in the main, simply could not-
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for
a very long period").
159 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
160 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). It is possible that in the
future some amount of around-the-clock human surveillance conducted on large
groups of people based on their political beliefs or other protected characteristics
could be held to be a search under an analysis similar to that conducted in Jones.
This, however, is outside the scope of the Jones ruling.
161 Id. at 953-54.
162 Id. at 964.
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identify with precision the point at which the tracking of th[e]
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the
4-week mark."' 63 The concurrences recognized that "other cases
may present more difficult questions," but noted that where there
was uncertainty, "the police may always seek a warrant," 6 4 thus
choosing to err on the side of protecting individual liberties.
There is no doubt that we will see litigation on this issue where
law enforcement uses GPS surveillance technology without a
warrant for less than twenty-eight days and where established
exceptions to the warrant requirement do not apply. There is also
no doubt that the area would benefit from statutory intervention.
In fact, at least one scholar has already proposed a detailed
legislative solution.'6 5 But this is no reason to condemn the
concurrences' rule as Kerr does.' In fact, an approach that leaves
it to legislatures to take a crack at determining the fine points of
doctrine-in this case defining when surveillance will be
considered "prolonged"-is often welcomed by constitutional
theorists as a minimalist intervention that prevents the Court from
usurping the proper Legislative role." Ironically, critics of the
concurring Justices' approach are asking for an opinion more
reminiscent of the widely condemned trimester framework adopted
by the Court in Roe v. Wade.'" The trimester framework set
detailed rules for states to follow when regulating abortion pre-
163 id.
164 Id.
165 See Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation ofMosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J.
OF CONsT. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 1-37 (2012).
166 Kerr, supra note 31, at 333 (criticizing ruling for leaving the time frame
unclear as part of a "grouping" problem).
167 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts
Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J.
1279, 1328 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 6-7 (1996) (advocating a "minimalist" approach to
judicial review where the Court rarely announces broad new principles and
instead proceeds incrementally).
168410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
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viability,16 9 and was finally abandoned by the Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.'70 In Casey, the Court maintained Roe's
outer limit allowing bans on abortion post-viability as long as a
woman's life and health are protected, and reaffirmed a woman's
right to abortion pre-viability. However, the Court allowed
increased regulation of pre-viability abortions, and left it to
legislatures to test the limits on their new power to regulate pre-
viability, and to the courts to work out which regulations imposed
"undue burdens" on the right to abortion.'
In this author's opinion, the more detailed framework provided
by Justice Blackmun in Roe was the result of a careful balancing of
interests and tied to the changing circumstances of pregnancy, the
risks inherent in continuation to term, the risks of the different
abortion procedures required at different stages of pregnancy, and
the changing nature of the zygote into embryo, previable fetus, and
then viable fetus.172  But the trimester framework was widely
excoriated as being too legislative.'
In this case, without the bio-physical markers provided by
changing fetal development and the evolving risks of pregnancy
and abortion procedures which largely correlate to the three
trimesters,'74 the concurring Justices adopted an approach similar
to that adopted by the Court in Casey, setting an outside limit and
leaving it to legislatures to set specific rules before that limit, or to
169 id
170 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992). In Casey, the Court referred to the trimester
framework as "an elaborate but rigid construction." Id. at 872. It went on,
however, to admit that it was overruling the trimester framework not because of
its rigidity, but because it disagreed with the balance struck by the Court
between the interests of the pregnant woman and the interests of the state in
regulation. Id. at 873 ("The trimester framework ... misconceives the nature of
the pregnant woman's interest; and in practice it undervalues the State's interest
in potential life.. . .").
'' Id. at 878-89 (summarizing holding).
172 Priscilla J. Smith, Responsibility for Life: How Abortion Serves Women's
Interests in Motherhood, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 97, 129 n.132 (2008).
' See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 167, at 20 (arguing that Roe was too
legislative and decided too many issues too quickly).
174 Smith, supra note 172, at 129 n.132.
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lower courts to address the issue in individual cases. There is no
reason to believe that the type of approach adopted in Jones
"would . . . deter enactment of statutory privacy regulations and
force judges to consider questions that they are poorly equipped to
answer," as Kerr claims."' As Justice Alito pointed out, Congress
responded to Katz by "promptly enac[ting] a comprehensive
statute, . . . and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has
been governed primarily by statute and not by case law.""' Nor
has the non-legislative approach had the effect of deterring
enactment of regulations in the abortion context. ' Accordingly, it
was certainly appropriate for the concurrences to avoid a
"legislative" solution here, using the principles highlighted above
to give guidance to law enforcement and the lower courts as they
move forward.
VI. CONCLUSION
The concurrences' view that warrantless GPS surveillance
violates Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test is guided by
the original principles the Fourth Amendment was designed to
promote-protecting against the potential for government abuse of
law enforcement powers 17' and the danger of the impact of a
chilling effect on protected behavior that would result from overly
'5Kerr, supra note 31, at 315.
176 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(internal citations omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006 ed. and Supp.
IV)).
1 See, e.g., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: Trends in the
First Quarter of 2012, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/updates/2012/statetrendsl2012.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013)
(describing record breaking pace of legislative enactments taking place in the
first quarter of 2011, when 127 abortion restrictions were approved by at least
one body, and 38 enacted); Monthly State Update: Major Developments in
2013, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/
index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013) (providing information on abortion
legislation in the first months of 2013 nationwide).
78 See, e.g., Smith et. al., supra note 35, at 178-79 & n.10 (listing additional
authority); see id. at 181-89 (examining Supreme Court decisions discussing the
Fourth Amendment's role in controlling potential for law enforcement abuse).
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permeating surveillance, now enabled by digital and satellite
technologies.'79 Using these two principles to determine whether
GPS surveillance is a reasonable search to which the limitations of
the warrant requirement apply, the concurrences endorse a
conception of privacy concerned with identity and self-expression
as much as information. Making more explicit the Fourth
Amendment's role in protecting privacy to protect these aspects of
identity would assist the Court in explaining its concerns about
new technology and a surveillance state. It also shares some
elements with the shift in other areas, such as abortion and gay
rights, from privacy to liberty and dignity concerns.'" For now,
the Government is free to continue to use GPS for surveillance
when it gets a warrant based on probable cause, or if one of the
other well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement
applies,"' or if it wants to test the line the Court has drawn in the
sand against a surveillance society. For now, at least, the Eye of
Sauron'82 has been shut.
19 See id. at 179 n.12 (citing Daniel J. Solove's discussion of the chilling
effects and harm to democracy and self-determination created by potential for
abuse of surveillance techniques in Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1101-02 (2002)).
iso In a different article, the author is exploring the relationship between the
evolution of the right to privacy to the rights to liberty, dignity and equality in
substantive due process cases and the evolution of the reasonable expectation of
privacy in Fourth Amendment cases. In both areas, changing realities of modem
life, views of the connection between sexuality and self-expression, and new
conceptions of equality are forcing the Court to rethink doctrine. Priscilla J.
Smith, Express Yourself The Evolving Doctrines of Privacy and Self-
Expression (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author).
181 Consider the circumstances in which Obi Wan tossed a tracking device
onto Boba Fett's spaceship as Boba fled the rainy planet, taking with him
evidence about the ordering and development of the Clone Army, including one
of the clones itself, the one Boba kept as a son. That was surely an exigent
circumstance.
182 See supra note 114. The Eye of Sauron is the image most often associated
with Sauron and which can see the book's hero, Frodo Baggins, when he
touches the titular Ring. Frodo Baggins, LORD OF THE RINGS WIKI,
http://lotr.wikia.com/wiki/Frodo Baggins (last visited May 10, 2013). See
generally J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE
RING (1954).
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